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Foreign investment and the activity of foreign firms can have a substantial 
effect on an economy. This study examines the short run and long run effects 
of the movement of locally owned firms from a developed country to an 
undeveloped country on the output and growth rate of each in the presence of 
home bias. The paper analyzes the direction of movement of firms over time, 
firm ownership, GDP, GNP, wages and long run growth rates using a model 
in which the source of growth is the increase in the number of firms (which 
produce with decreasing marginal productivity). Various government policies 
towards the entry of foreign firms are examined and it is found that for the 
undeveloped country harsher policies towards entering firms lead to better 
results in the long run. Counter-policies are briefly discussed. 
 
1 Introduction 
Multinational firms are accountable for an increasingly large share of world trade. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI)
1 is increasing more rapidly than income (especially in 
the developing countries) and is thus becoming a dominant factor in determining a 
country’s economic performance.
2 This is occurring despite the home bias phenomenon 
in which preference is given to investment in one's home country over investment in 
foreign countries, even when this is not the optimal decision.
3 
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1  An analysis of FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment can be found in Goldstein & Razin (2005).   
2 See Markusen and Venables (1998). Data on FDI and transnational corporations can be found at 
UNCTAD (2002). 
3  French & Poterba (1991) analyze this phenomenon. See also Obstfeld (1998).  2  
The movement of firms between countries, which is analogous to labor migration 
between countries,
4 has a substantial effect on their economies. Countries react to the 
entrance of foreign firms in a variety of ways, ranging from the encouragement of entry 
to the discouragement of entry through various ways of taxation. Thus, while many 
countries encourage the entry of firms through subsidies and tax exemptions (Ireland, for 
example, used low tax rates for foreign firms), others, such as China and India, 'tax' 
foreign firms through requirements for partial local ownership or the sharing of 
knowledge.
5 
Multinational firms have previously been analyzed in horizontal as well as 
vertical frameworks. The horizontal approach, in which firms locate production plants in 
several countries, was adopted in Markusen (1984, 1995), who analyzed national and 
multinational enterprises with firm-level knowledge. A similar approach appears in 
Markusen & Venables (1998). A different approach, which separates headquarters from 
production, appears in Helpman (1984). Grossman & Helpman (1991) explored an 
international economy with monopolistic competition and sustained endogenous growth 
in quality or variety of products, in which firms can separate activities across countries. 
Grossman, Helpman & Szeidl (2003) examined the firm's decision regarding the 
production and assembly of an intermediate good in a framework with different ex-post 
productivity for each firm. In a similar framework, Antràs & Helpman (2004) analyzed 
the firm's decision regarding integration vs. the outsourcing of intermediate goods 
production in a global economy
6 and Grossman & Helpman (2005) studied the firm’s 
                                                  
4  Aharonovitz (2006) deals with the effects of the movement (migration and commuting) of workers. 
5  See UNCTAD (2002: 204-208) and Wei & Shleifer (2000: 306, 311-313). 
6   A   similar question concerning ownership and control is analyzed in Feenstra & Hanson (2005). 3  
choice of outsourcing partner. Alvarez & Lucas (2004) analyzed gains from trade in an 
economy with different levels of productivity.
7  
Though a great deal of research has been done on the multinational firm’s 
decision making and on the effect of multinational firms and international trade on 
economic growth, little has been said about the effect of ownership on the firms in this 
framework, particularly in the presence of home bias. The aim of this study is to analyze 
the short and long run effects of a (possible) movement of locally owned firms from a 
developed country to an undeveloped country on their output and growth rate.  
In this paper, a model is constructed in which the production of a single good 
takes place in a given number of firms (which are using labor as the only production 
factor), each with decreasing marginal productivity. Growth is the result of an increase in 
the number of firms which depends positively on both profitability and the number of 
firms (which represents the stock of knowledge relevant to establishing a new firm). In a 
framework with one developed country that has many firms and one less developed 
country that has no firms, firms may migrate from the former to the latter in order to 
increase their profitability, despite the home bias of their owners. However, in later 
periods, firms may migrate back from the (now developed) country to their former home.  
Three policies towards the entry of firms are analyzed. The first, which allows 
firms to freely enter, leads to the same growth rate in both countries in the long run, 
though the less developed country always remains with a lower wage and level of output 
than the developed country. The second, in which the undeveloped country requires 
partial local ownership, leads to a higher growth rate in the short run in the less-
developed country and eventual convergence of the wage, GDP and growth rates (though 
                                                  
7  See also Eaton & Kortum (2002). 4  
not of GNP) in the two countries. The last policy to be analyzed requires an increasingly 
larger share of local ownership over time. It results in a faster growth rate of the 
undeveloped country and eventual convergence of the wage, GDP, GNP and growth rates 
of the two countries, and may even lead to the undeveloped country overtaking
8 the 
developing country in GNP. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium under various government policies. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2  The Model  
In order to analyze the effect of the migration of firms, a simple growth model is 
constructed. The model is first presented for the case of a single country in order to 
demonstrate its characteristics and is then expanded to the two-country case.  
2.1  A Single Country Growth Model  
Assume a single country with a labor force of size L which remains unchanged in 
every period. Output is produced by several firms which all manufacture the same 
product
9 using labor as the sole input. The number of firms operating in each period is 
denoted by  t n . 
The production function, f(l), which is common to all firms, has positive but 
decreasing marginal productivity and satisfies Inada
10 (1963)’s conditions. For simplicity, 
the following functional form is assumed:
11 
                                                  
8  For an example of overtaking, see Brezis, Krugman & Tsiddon (1993). 
9 Using a variety of products which are perfect substitutes and have the same production function (and 
therefore the same price) yields a similar result. 
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Firms operate under perfect competition but there is no free entry of new firms. 
Since perfect competition is assumed and all firms are alike, each firm employs 
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Note that profit is decreasing in the total number of firms. 
Since firms are continuously opening new facilities while closing old ones, it is 
assumed that each firm exists for only one period and that at the end of the period its 
production facilities become obsolete. At the end of the period the "parent" firm is 
divided into several new firms that operate in the next period under the same ownership 
(possible changes in the ownership of the new firms are discussed in sub-Section 2.2). 
There is no (free) entry of other firms into the market since the knowledge and facilities 
necessary for production are obtainable only from the operation of an existing firm. The 
number of new firms created from an existing one depends on the profit of the firm and 
on the total number of firms. Thus, the more profitable a firm is, the more new firms it 
can establish and the more firms that exist, the easier (though less profitable) it is to 
establish new firms (since the number of firms represents the stock of knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                  
11 Similar results (though without a constant rate of growth) can be derived for a more general production 
function which satisfies the Inada conditions.  6  
available for use in the establishment of new firms out of existing firms). This last 
assumption is similar to the commonly made assumption that knowledge is a public good 
(see for example Grossman and Helpman (1991:57-62)).
12 Denote the number of firms 
created as  )) ( , ( t t n n g π , where  1 ) , ( > t t n g π  for positive n and π , and  0 , 0 > > π g g n  
though π  is decreasing in n.
13 Moreover, it is assumed that the increase in g due to an 
increase in the number of existing firms is exactly the same as the decrease in g due to the 
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  The total GDP of the economy in period t is, therefore: 
(5) 
α α L n l f n Y t t t t
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t t n L L w , which corresponds to a labor share of 
output equal to α . The corresponding share of firms is ) 1 ( α − . 
  The consumers, who are also the workers and the owners of the firms, live for a 
single period (L consumers in each period), without any possibility of saving. Therefore, 
their demand for consumption equals their income (GNP) and therefore the market clears. 
Note that Walras' Law allows for the analysis of the labor market's equilibrium without 
analyzing the market for goods. 
                                                  
12 Note also that the increase in the number of firms assumed here resembles the constant increase in the 
number of products in their model. 
13 Another way of modeling this would have been to assume that an existing production facility continues 
to operate in the next period and that (g-1) new facilities are created from each existing firm. See Section 4 
for further discussion of the differences between the two methods. 
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Proposition 1: The wage and GDP grow at the same constant rate. 
Proof: The growth rate of output depends on the growth rate of the number of firms 
which is constant: 




















A similar equation for the wage yields the identical growth rate.  
QED 
  Moreover, since the number of firms in period t is
1
1
− t k n , one can easily find the 
wage, profit and output for each period. Note that the total profit of all firms grows at the 
same rate, but since the number of firms grows even faster, the profit of a single firm 
decreases over time.
15 
  So far I have analyzed the model for the simple case of a single country. I turn 
now to analyze the case of two countries and examine the mutual influences between 
them. 
2.2  The Complete Model 
Assume a world with two countries, H and F, each with a labor force of size L. 
The output in each country is produced, as before, by several firms manufacturing the 
same product using labor as the sole input. The number of firms in each period in each 
country is denoted by  
i
t n  , i=H,F. The production function is the same as before.  




 workers who are paid their marginal productivity: 
                                                  
15 As before, this result resembles the case of product variety; see, for example, Grossman & Helpman 
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Therefore the profit of a particular firm is: 
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Each firm exists for only one period and at the end of the period it is divided into 
g new firms, where g depends on the profit of the firm and on the total number of firms in 
the world. Thus, a more profitable firm grows faster and therefore has a faster 
multiplication rate. The more firms there are, the more knowledge is available for the 
establishment of new firms and therefore the easier it is to do so. Since a free flow of 
knowledge is assumed between the two countries, the multiplication rate is affected by 
the total number of firms in the world.
16 Therefore, one obtains  )) ( , (
i n n g π  with the 
same assumptions as before. A necessary additional assumption (though only a technical 
one) is that the multiplication rate is not excessively high: 
(9) )) ( , ( )) ( , ( ,
j j i j i j i i j i n n n g n n n n g n n n π π + > + > ∀  
This assumption ensures that when the number of firms in one country is fewer than that 
in the other, it will not exceed it in the next period but only move towards it, since 
otherwise repeated overtaking might occur. A continuous model would not require such 
an assumption. The example from the previous section is relevant here as well. 
  At the beginning of each period, the newly established firms choose where (i.e. in 
which country) to locate their activity. This decision is made by the owners of the firms 
                                                  
16 This assumption is similar to that of international spillovers of knowledge; see for example Grossman & 
Helpman (1991:178). 9  
and is affected by a home bias,
17 where the ownership of a firm can be only H (citizens of 
the home country), only F (citizens of the foreign country) or any mixture of the two. In 
the case of mixed ownership, the share of ownership of investors from one country in the 
parent firm of a firm operating in period t will be denoted by  t B,   and therefore the share 
of ownership of investors from the other country will be  ) 1 ( t B − . When no changes in 
ownership occur, these shares also represent the ownership situation of the firm which is 
actually operating in period t. The home bias effect causes owners to demand higher 
profits in order to locate the activity of a firm outside of their own country. Therefore, the 
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where  1 > γ  stands for the preference of the owners for an activity in their own country, 
and for simplicity a symmetric preference between the two countries is assumed (i.e.γ  is 
equal for both countries). In a similar manner, when the share  t B  of a parent firm is 
owned by investors from country j (and the rest by owners from country i), the condition 









t t B B B B π γπ γπ π + − ≥ + − ) 1 ( ) 1 (  
since each owner has a bias towards his home country.  
Notice that the owners' decision is based solely on profits in the next period. 
However, sufficiently high discount rates can yield the same results (see Section 4 for 
discussion). 
                                                  
17 See the Introduction for references and some elaboration. 10  
Ownership of the new firms remains the same as that of the parent firm,
18 unless 
the owners are willing to give up some of their ownership (see sub-Sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
In an identical situation to the one presented above, when owners are required to give up 
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where  t B is the ownership of investors from country j in the parent firm, i.e. the 
ownership prior to giving upβ . The right side of (12) is the investors' profit from 
locating in country i (adjusted for home bias) while the left side is the profit from locating 
in country j adjusted for home bias and the requirement to give up a share of the firm.
19 
  During the evolvement of the economy two types of ownership can be created - 
direct or chained through other firms. However, we only need to keep track of the origin 
of the owners and not the form of ownership. Consider, for example, a firm in the first 
period owned by H investors. Now assume that in the second period it multiplies into two 
companies, both of which operate in H. These two new companies can either be held 
directly by investors in H (in this case there are two separate companies) or held by the 
first period “parent” company, which serves as a holding company of the two new 
companies (it has no other activity) and is itself owned by the investors in H (thus, 
resulting in a multi-plant firm). In a similar manner, if one of the two new companies 
operates in F, then under the former form of (direct) ownership this is simply an 
                                                  
18 Another possible interpretation is that the new firms are established by senior managers of the parent 
firm, who acquired the necessary skills and knowledge, and the origins of those senior managers are 
divided between the countries in the same ratio as the owners. Therefore the new ownership is, on average, 
divided between the two countries in the same ratio as the previous one, although the owners themselves 
are different.  
19 Notice that the condition refers only to the profit of the current period, see sub-Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and 
Discussion for an elaboration and for the case of the discounted stream of profits. 11  
investment abroad, while under the latter form of ownership the first period firm becomes 
a multinational firm, with a subsidiary in H  and a subsidiary in F. The division of 
ownership between the countries affects the decision of where to locate as described 
above, but the method of holding (i.e. directly or through another firm) does not, and as a 
result we do not need to keep track of the form of ownership. Therefore, although both 
multi-plant and multinational firms evolve in this model as part of the growth process and 
the migration of firms between countries, it does not need to be analyzed. 
  The specification of consumption behavior will complete the model. The 
consumers in each country, who are also the workers and the owners of the firms, live for 
a single period (L consumers in each period), without the possibility of saving. Therefore, 
total demand equals their total income (i.e. GNP) and the market will clear. 
  The next section considers the situation when an undeveloped country decides to 
allow the entry of foreign firms. 
 
3 Entry  Policies 
  Migration of firms has a significant effect on the economy, and therefore it is 
accompanied by government policy. When a country decides to allow foreign firms to 
operate within it, there are several (active trade) policies it can adopt, each leading to a 
different result. One option is to encourage entry through subsidization of the foreign 
firms, i.e. reduced tax rates and grants. At the other extreme is the policy of taxing 
foreign firms which can take the form of demanding the sharing of knowledge or 
requiring a share of the ownership for local citizens (possibly one that increases over 
time) even when local owners will not be contributing to the activity of the firm. The 12  
effects of allowing entry are analyzed under several possible policy regimes when one 
country is developed and the other is undeveloped and the latter decides to allow foreign 
firms to operate within it. 
Assume two countries, H and F. In period T, prior to the possibility of entry,  T n  
firms, owned by H owners, operate in H. There are no firms owned by residents of F and 
therefore no firms operate in F prior to the possibility of entry. At the beginning of period 
T, country F decides to allow foreign firms to operate within it, either with or without 
restrictions.  
3.1 Free  Entry 
One extent of policy is to encourage the entry of foreign firms through tax 
exemptions, grants, restrictions on the import of similar products, etc.
20 The policy 
analyzed here is a more 'neutral' one, where country F simply allows foreign firms to 
operate within it without restriction. Since all the firms are owned by residents of H, the 
entry condition in (10) applies and firms will move to F until 
α α
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Proposition 2: A free entry policy immediately improves the wage, GDP and GNP in F 
and leads to continuing growth in those variables but F does not catch up to H in any of 
these variables. 
                                                  
20 See UNCTAD (2002: 204-208) for a description of the various incentives and for detailed description of 
policy in Ireland and Malaysia. 13  
Proof: According to (13), the number of firms in F grows from zero to
F
T n . As a result, 
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T n n > (since  ) 1 > γ  and the companies located in F are owned by 
residents of H, the wage, GDP and GNP will be higher in H.  
Since firms can freely migrate in and out of F and ownership remains unchanged, 
equation (13) holds for every period t,  T t ≥  and the same ratio of 
H n  to 
F n  will prevail 
in every period. The long run growth rate of the wage, GDP and GNP is  1
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which is equivalent to  1
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. Therefore, the wage, GDP and GNP grow at the 
same rate in both countries and thus remain higher in country H.  
QED 




t t n n g n n g π π > ,
21 firms in F 
multiply faster than those in H. However, since the proportion of firms operating in F 
(out of the total n) remains the same, firms are continually migrating back to H. Note also 
that since the demand for consumption equals GNP (see sub-Section 2.2), the goods 
market in each country is cleared with the import (or export) of goods equal to the 
difference between GNP and GDP. 
  The short run effects on F are straightforward. The wage, GDP and GNP of 
country F rise and can rise even further if a policy of subsidization is implemented in that 
period. In the long run, country F’s rate of growth depends on the growth in the number 













t t n n g n n g π π > . 14  
of firms, which is between  )) ( , (
F
t t n n g π  and )) ( , (
H
t t n n g π , but F will always lag behind 
H in all three variables.
22 Figure 1, in which entry is permitted from period 6 onward, 
demonstrates this. Thus, in period 6 there is an improvement in F's GDP and GNP and 
continuous growth thereafter (at the same rate in both countries). Note that F's variables 
are always lower than those of country H.  
 
Figure 1 Here 
 
3.2 Joint  Ownership 
  Many countries demand a share of local ownership as a prerequisite for the 
entrance of a foreign firm. This is done, among other reasons, in order to encourage local 
industry, to better monitor the operations of foreign firms or can simply be the result of 
corruption.
23 Therefore, the second policy option to be analyzed is the requirement of a 
one-time tax in the form of joint ownership in exchange for the right to operate in F. 
When a fully H-owned firm wishes to operate in F, it must give up a share  β  of its 
ownership to local owners. Firms established from that firm in the following periods can 
operate in F (without further "taxation") or migrate out of F while retaining the same 
division of ownership. They can, of course, freely return to F later since β  of their 
ownership is held by residents of F. 
                                                  
22  It should be mentioned that a single period subsidy to foreign firms followed by a free entry policy 
yields similar long run results. 
23     See Wei & Shleifer (2000: 311-313). 15  
  Under this policy regime, when country F begins to allow entry, the condition that 
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and firms will continue moving to F until 
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Proposition 3: A policy of joint ownership leads to an immediate improvement in F’s 
wage, GDP and GNP and continuing growth in those variables in subsequent periods. 
Catch-up in wage and GDP is possible for a sufficiently largeβ (i.e. share of local 
ownership) but there can be no catch-up in GNP. 
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T n L n L , respectively. Notice, 
however, that under this policy regime the proportion 
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T n  of  T n  is smaller than under 









T T n n g n n g π π > , firms 
in F multiply faster than those in H and profits decrease at a faster rate. Furthermore, this 




t > < ,  as can be seen from equation (9). As long 
                                                  
24 If firms discount future profits, the demand for local ownership also implies loss of some future profits, 
as well as loss of control. Therefore, firms request higher compensation (i.e. higher current profits) in order 
to migrate to F, resulting in lower (yet positive) number of migrating firms (and higher profits in F). 16  
as this situation prevails, the entrance condition (14) will not hold for fully H-owned 
firms and new firms will not enter country F. However, since firms operating in country 
F are now partially locally owned, migration out of F needs to be carefully analyzed.  
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T n n >  and this situation cannot be reversed (since as 
F n  approaches 
H n  its 
growth rate decreases and once they equalize so do the two growth rates, while equation 
(9) ensures that there can be no reversal between the two), the reversal of profitability 
cannot occur and there is no migration to H. The share of 
F n  in n approaches one half. 
To see this, define  0 , > ε ε , as a desirable difference between 
H n  and 
F n  (ε  can be 
chosen as arbitrarily small), and note with  ε > ∆ ∆, , the current (actual) difference 
between 
H n  and 
F n . Every ε  produces a difference in the multiplication rates of the 
firms in the two countries which, for high enough 0 t , reduces ∆ to ε  within  0 t  periods. 
Since the actual difference in the multiplication rates is higher (since the actual difference 
in the number of firms is greater than ε ), the number of periods required to achieve ε  is 
smaller than  0 t . The difference between 
H n  and 
F n  approaches 0 and therefore the share 17  
of 
F n  in n approaches one half. As a result, the wage and GDP equalize between the two 
countries while the GNP of H remains higher due to the ownership of firms operating in 








t 1 1 + + <π π . Since the share of F firms is less than half, their multiplication rate is higher 
than that of H firms and the gap in profits becomes increasingly smaller (as above). Once 
F π  is close enough to
H π , firms start to migrate back to H, but this time with a share of 
F ownership. The share of firms in F will remain stable from that time on, but since they 
multiply faster, out-migration will persist. Note that although country F's wage, GDP and 
GNP grow continuously, they will remain smaller than those of country H.
25,26 
QED 
In the short run, the wage, GDP and GNP increase. Note that the wage and GDP 
are smaller under this policy than under the free entry policy, whereas GNP may be either 
higher or lower, depending on the size of  β . 
In contrast, long run results are more positive than under free entry. Since fewer 
firms migrate to F initially, their multiplication rate is higher and thus so is the 
economy’s growth rate, although it decreases over time. For 
2
1
≥ β , F’s growth rate is 
higher than that of H, but decreasing over time so that the share of firms operating in F 
approaches one half and the wage and GDP of the two countries equalize over time. The 
                                                  
25  Note again that according to the assumptions made with regard to consumers, the market for goods is 
cleared in every period. 
26 If firms discount future profits, smaller (but positive) number of firms migrate to F in the first period, 
resulting in lower wage and GDP than those computed in the proof for that period (but still, higher than 
without entrance). The rest of the proof and the result with regard to the long-run remain unchanged. 18  




< β , the multiplication rate of F firms remains higher, but some F firms (with the 
proportionβ of F ownership) migrate out from a certain point in time onward, so that the 
wage, GDP and GNP in F remain lower. However, a comparison of equations (17) and 








 ) and all three variables are closer to those of country H relative to the 
previous policy of free entry. 
 
Figure 2 Here 
 
3.3  Increase in Local Ownership over Time 
  Firms operating in a foreign country may be subject to an ongoing increase in the 
share of local ownership or an increase in the local activity in the same sector. This can 
be the result of, among other things, a government policy to encourage local workers to 
open their own firms or to encourage spillovers of knowledge to local firms (by not 
protecting intellectual property) or may simply be the result of ongoing corruption 
Whatever the reason, the result is an ongoing increase in local ownership, which is 
equivalent to a periodical 'tax' on the original owners. Therefore, the final policy to be 
analyzed is the requirement of an increasing share of local ownership each period in 
exchange for the right to operate in F. When a firm chooses to operate in F in a particular 
period, the previous owners (the owners of the "parent" firm) are left with only  β − 1  of 
the new firm, while a share of  β  is allocated to local owners. This is repeated in every 19  
period in which the firm operates in F, whether its "parent" firm operated in H or F, and 
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  Under this policy regime, since all firms are of H ownership, when F begins 
allowing entry and since firms maximize the profit of only the current period
27, the 
entrance condition remains the same as in the previous case (i.e. equation (14)) and firms 
move to F until 
α α
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T n  equal their 
values in equation (15).  
Proposition 4: A policy of increasing local ownership over time leads to an immediate 
improvement in F’s wage, GDP and GNP. F will catch up in these variables in the long 
run. Whether it overtakes H depends on g. 
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T n L n L , respectively. Notice that 
all three variables are of the same magnitude as in the case of the previous policy (i.e. 
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T T n n g n n g π π > , firms multiply faster in F than in H and profits decrease 
faster in F than in H. As long as this situation continues, the entry condition in (14) will 
not hold for any fully H-owned firms and new firms will not enter F.  
                                                  
27 See Section 4 for a discussion of the discounted stream of profits case. 20  
Firms that choose to migrate from F back to H will not return to F. Firms that 
migrate out of F with local ownership of  B (the ownership of their parent firms which 
equals the ownership of the new firms if they leave F) satisfy: 
(19) 
H H F F B B B B π γπ γπ π β + − < + − − ) 1 ( ] ) 1 )[( 1 (,   
which can be rearranged as: 
(20) 
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Since the share of local F ownership among firms that stayed in F increases over time, 
the right side of (20) decreases (for any  B B > ) and for the same profit ratio there will 
not be any additional migration back to H, which would have increased the left side of 
(20). The multiplication rate of firms in F is higher than in H and therefore without such 
migration the ratio of the firm proportions (right side of (21)) decreases and therefore so 
does the left side of (21) and (20). Therefore, the exit condition expressed in equation 
(19) for firms with F ownership of B  continues to be valid and there is no return 
migration to F of those firms.  
  Notice that the share of F ownership in firms that decide to continue operating in 
country F increases over time and eventually approaches 1. Since there are no firms 
entering F in the periods following T, the share of F ownership in all firms that operate in 
F approaches 1. 
In the long run, since local F ownership approaches 1, the exit condition becomes: 21  
(22)  
H F π γπ β < − ) 1 (,  
but since (18) ensures that  1 ) 1 ( > − γ β , this last condition requires that 
H F π π < , or 
H F n n > , a condition that contradicts assumption (9). Therefore, there is no migration 
from F back to H in the long run and the share of firms in each of the two countries 
approaches one half (as in Proposition 3 with 
2
1
≥ β ) and therefore the wage and GDP in 
each of the two countries approach equality. 
Overtaking in GNP requires that some firms (with a share of F ownership) 
migrate out of F. The condition for this to occur is given in equation (12), which can be 
rearranged as:  
(23) 




















+    (see also equation (20)) 
According to (21), for some g functions the left side of equation (23) is close enough to 1 
(when B is small enough), such that migration from F back to H can occur. For example, 
if the left side of (23) is close enough to 1 for t=T, (23) becomes 








which is valid for every β  as long as 5 . 1 1 < <γ . Therefore, for some values of γ  and 
functional forms of g, migration from F back to H is possible. In such cases, overtaking 
in GNP occurs since in later periods the number of firms operating in each country 
equalizes and some firms which operate in H are (partially) F owned. Otherwise, the 
GNPs of the two countries approach equality, as do the wages and GDPs. 22  
 Notice that if the left side of (23) does not approach 1 rapidly enough, then as B 
approaches 1 the right side of (23) equals 
γ β) 1 (
1
−
  which is smaller than 1 (see equation 
(18)) and there is no return migration or overtaking. 
28 
QED 
  Figure 3 describes the development of GDP and GNP in both countries under this 
policy with entry beginning in period 6. Notice that while the GDPs of the two countries 
approach equality (as does the number of firms operating in each country), the GNP of F 
overtakes that of H. This occurs because, as a result of the specific g function used here, 
several firms with a share of F ownership migrated back to H and the ownership in F 
approaches pure local ownership over time. Note that though the overtaking in GNP 
seems negligible in the graph, the logarithmic scale is misleading and the difference in 
that example is in fact about 12%. 
 
Figure 3 Here 
 
Proposition 5: Overtaking in GNP can be achieved for every g satisfying the previous 
assumptions using a more complicated policy scheme.  
Proof: Assume a policy scheme similar to the one analyzed in which a requirement for 
increasing local ownershipβ  over time that satisfies (18) is enforced in every period 
except period S, S>T, where S  is chosen so that a firm's profit in each of the countries is 
similar in that period. Denote the requirement for local ownership in S as  1 β , such that: 
                                                  





1 1 − > , 
and therefore  γ β ) 1 ( 1 1 − > . The condition for migration from F to H at the beginning of 





S B B B B π γ π γ β ) ) 1 (( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 + − < + − − , as compared to (12).  




S π π  →  ∞ →  and  1   →  ∞ → S B , equation (25) 
approaches 1 ) 1 ( 1 < − γ β  when S is sufficiently high. Therefore, since this condition is 
satisfied by (24), one can choose S high enough so that (25) is satisfied and some firms 
with F ownership will migrate to H.  
In the next period, the requirement for additional F ownership is reduced again 
to β . Since firms in F multiplied faster in period S, not all the firms born from the above 
migrant firms would return to F so that some of the firms will stay in H. As in 
Proposition 4, the number of firms in each country approaches equality, as do the wage 
and GDP. However, F’s GNP is now higher since some of the firms operating in H are 
partly F-owned, while the ownership of the firms operating in F approaches pure local 
ownership. 
QED 
  In the comparison of this policy to the previous one (i.e. a fixed share of local 
ownership), short run (first-period) results are identical (for the sameβ ), while long run 
results may differ. In the intermediate run, if g is such that the gap between the two 
countries is closing rapidly, then under the increasing local ownership policy, there is 
return migration of firms and therefore medium range wage and GDP may be lower. 
However, long run results are more favorable, though they may take longer to achieve 24  
due to the aforementioned return migration, since they include catch-up in all parameters 
and possible overtaking in GNP. Note, however, that the comparison in the short run and 
in the intermediate run (convergence path) is problematic, because the optimal β  differs 
between the policies (
2
1




1− ≤  in the latter). 
  
4 Discussion 
In the model that was presented, growth is generated by an increase in the number 
of firms which depends on both the profitability of firms and the stock of knowledge, as 
represented by the number of firms. In a two-country framework, where one country is 
developed and has many firms and the other is undeveloped and has no firms, it was 
shown that the migration of profit-maximizing firms from the developed to the 
undeveloped country (despite the owners' home bias) exported the growth process to the 
undeveloped country, thus putting the developed country at risk of losing its advantage. 
Three entry policies were analyzed for the undeveloped country with the result that a 
harsher policy yields better long-run results. While all policies improve the immediate 
term situation
29 and yield equal long run growth rates for the two countries, the free entry 
policy leaves the undeveloped country with a permanent lag behind the developed 
country. The one-time tax policy (i.e. joint ownership) leads to convergence in GDP and 
a harsher policy of ongoing taxation (in the form of increasing local ownership over time) 
results in convergence in GDP and overtaking in GNP. Therefore, according to this 
model a policy of taxation is recommended as opposed to the policy of subsidization 
adopted by many countries. 
                                                  
29  Note, however, that the first policy analyzed yielded more favorable short run results. 25  
Notice, however, that this recommendation holds in the case in which foreign 
firms, once they have begun operating in the undeveloped country, can produce and 
grow. An appropriate education level among the population, protection of property rights, 
a developed infrastructure and other similar conditions for this process to occur were 
assumed to exist. Otherwise, the growth process does not occur.  
The aim of the policy (i.e. catching up with or overtaking the other country) and 
the policy recommendation with regard to the long run get an interesting interpretation 
when the situation is different than two equally-sized countries. If the developed world is 
large relative to a small undeveloped country, the latter does not affect the world output 
and growth rate. In that case, overtaking also means achieving the highest output in the 
long run. If there are several undeveloped countries, those countries might compete on 
migrating firms by offering various benefits. Countries that will not offer benefits but 
rather take a harsher policy would get fewer entering firms (but still, a positive number, 
since the profits of a single firm increase when the number of firms decreases), and 
therefore lower short-run output and wage, but they enjoy better long run result. Since 
some firms do enter, the long run result of the harsher policy (increase in local ownership 
over time) would still be overtaking.  
Two simplifying assumptions need to be discussed here. The first is that during 
the growth process a firm multiplies into g>1 firms and that all new firms are able to 
migrate. An alternative to this assumption would have been that the firm continues to 
exist and that a positive number of new firms are created (with only new firms being able 
to migrate). Results in this case would be similar, but perhaps achieved at a slower pace. 
Thus, when entry becomes possible, migration to the undeveloped country could continue 26  
for more than one period since the share of migrating firms that equalizes profits may be 
larger than the share of new (migration-able) firms. However, long run results remain 
unchanged.  
Another simplifying assumption of the model is that firms base their decisions on 
profits only in the current period rather than discounting the entire stream of future 
profits. While under the first policy discounting future profits changes nothing and under 
the second one there is only a minor change in the first period (see sub-Section 3.2), 
under the last policy analyzed, in which firms that migrate to F lose additional ownership 
in every period, accounting for future profits could affect the return-migration decision 
and therefore the model's result. Note, however, that since the relevant period in the 
model is long, an assumption of a high enough discount rate is a natural one. In such a 
case, when entry becomes permissible, the profit required to induce migration is higher 
and therefore less firms migrate. However, the process that follows remains the same as 
long as the home bias and the discount rate are sufficiently high relative to the periodic 
'tax' (which is determined by the undeveloped country itself). Some firms will operate in 
F, and those firms would become locally owned. Since the difference in profits in the 
long run (as viewed by the firms in each country, i.e. adjusted for the home bias) between 
the current country a firm operates within and the other country is strictly positive, those 
firms would not migrate out and catching-up (and overtaking) will occur. Therefore 
discounting the stream of future profits does not affect the result with regard to the long 
run.  
Finally, we turn briefly to the discussion of counter-policies that may be adopted 
by the developed country. The movement of firms from the developed country H to the 27  
undeveloped country F leads to F becoming the more developed country if it adopts the 
appropriate policy and H allows the free entry of firms. This is a result of the behavior of 
profit-maximizing firms that does not take into account the firm’s effect on the long run 
balance between the two economies. There are a number of counter-policies that H could 
adopt including, for example, the reduction of out-migration once entry is allowed either 
through direct restrictions on local firms, through subsidization or using a tax policy 
which increases H's local ownership. Notice, however, that the former two policies 
merely postpones the overtaking while the latter leads to convergence instead of 
overtaking and does not enable the developed country to retain any lead that it once had. 
The issue of counter-policies and the reaction to them requires additional research, since 
it appears that liberal policies may not be recommended if a country wishes to maintain 
its economic leadership. 28  
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Figure 1 – GDP and GNP of H and F under Free Entry 
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Figure 2 – GDP and GNP of H and F under Joint Ownership 
Plotted for  1 = L , 
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Figure 3 – GDP and GNP of H and F under Increasing Local Ownership 
Plotted for  1 = L , 
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